China's Food Safety Regulatory Model in the "Public Sphere"

Li Xiaogang

Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai, China

Abstract   In recent years, China's considerable food safety incidents have occurred. Food safety regulation has become a focused field of study, while the researches have yielded fruitful results. But, in general, the domestic research on food safety supervision is inadequate in the fields of study and the theoretical research. Although some scholars have committed to the interests of the game from the perspective of food safety supervision in the Conduct of Parties, but few scholars have pointed out that there is a "public sphere in China's food safety regulation." I found the regulation has a "blank area" according to the interests of the game, and think that only break the government-led regulatory approach, actively introduce civil society forces to achieve multiple subjects actively foster cooperation and the third sector, build food regulatory information sharing platform to achieve full regulatory cover, can achieve the request of general secretary Xi Jinping that "Food safety needs supervision."

Keywords   Food safety supervision, Interests of the game, Public sphere

1. Summary

Food safety regulation originated in the West, with the emergence of a series of considerable food safety incidents. Food safety regulation had become a hot academic research. Akerlof (1970) proposed the paradigm of asymmetric information theory and provided an important new theory to explain the method. Academic will experience rapid development in the area "why should food safety problems occur" (Rolf, M.2007). Public interest theory of government food safety regulators provides a theoretical basis that food security is an important part of the government's public responsibilities. However, Utton (1986), Noll (1989), Becker (1983) and others questioned the idea that the public interests in the theory of "government regulation is for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society," insisting on in the government interest groups who advocated the interests of interest groups. Stigler (1971) questioned the conclusions of public interest theory with empirically validate, and proposed the idea of the government captive (Aruoma, O. 2006).

Due to different developments from foreign markets, feelings of scholars to study based on Chinese conditions for food safety regulatory model and its operation. Scholars not only pointed out the existence of the current regulatory approach segmentation policies from different departments (Lin Mingang etc, 2008), overlapping functions, responsibilities unclear, inadequate enforcement of conditions (Lin Mingang; Xu Jinliang, 2008), also pointed out that the existence of government-led regulatory monopoly (Zhang Xuan, Chen Fuzhong, 2010), the regulatory fragmentation (Li Jing, 2011), regulatory authority and institutional settings unreasonable problems (Yu Hui, Wang Yaozhong). In response, researchers have put forward their own model solution, and currently scholars generally believe that the state should change, "Break", "sub-species" supervision as "vertical" or "independent" regulatory (Han Zhongwei, Li Yuji, 2010). Network analysis of Ding Huang which is based on the perspective from the "level" theoretical pointed of view that the government regulators are often unable to separate the overall care, resulting in lax oversight, quality, and frequent accidents (Ding Huang; Sun wen, 2014). Liu Peng (2010) and other scholars from the perspective of institutional change and food safety regulatory system to study, pointed out that food safety regulatory issues and then make recommendations for improvement. Yan Haina (2010) pointed out that the use of the Government's overall theoretical analysis of the current food safety regulatory system in the organizational structure, new responsibilities and incentives, partnerships, organizational culture there are still missing in four dimensions (Yan Haina; Nieyong Hao, 2009).

Overall, Researchers on domestic food safety regulatory model lacks of theoretical analysis basis. Although institutional changing theory can explain the transformation of the regulatory model, the research is mainly to discuss the government itself which has not been extended (Yan Haina,

2009; Liu Peng, 2010); "level theory," though well discussed relationship between the government's regulatory approach and capabilities, after all the discussion surrounding the government itself, which isn't considered along with other stakeholders. Compared with other theory, game theory is widely used to analyze food safety supervision in stakeholders' interaction and self-discipline conditions. Game theory can not only benefit from a dynamic perspective of the interests of maintaining all the stakeholders together, but also found inadequate food safety regulatory model from the static on institutional defects. Not much use game theory research interests, mainly Ding Huang, Zuo Wei. The interests of the game, as a food safety regulation theory analysis tools, they are only around two-party game for analysis, without involving the interests of multi-stakeholders, thus establishing a unified analytical framework. Therefore, this game from a theoretical point of interest, the interests of the game hopes to build the model, for food safety regulation in the interests of the tripartite stakeholders are discussed, regulators found in the "middle ground" - unsupervised "public sphere". It aims to construct a unified food safety regulatory frame of theoretical analysis, on this basis and assumptions of the inevitability of food safety regulatory model to a multi-center development.

2. The Interests of Game Theory

2.1. Nash Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium is also known as non-cooperative game balance. If none of the participants can act alone and increase revenue under some circumstance, this strategy combination is called the Nash equilibrium points. Nash equilibrium is proposed by Nobel laureate John • Nash, who used the prisoner's dilemma for us and brilliantly expounded the essence of the Nash equilibrium, which has the following characteristics.

(1) Nash game, in essence, is a non-cooperative game state. Suppose there are numbers of players involved in the game, given the conditions of other people strategy and each player chooses their optimal strategy in order to maximize their own interests. All the players' strategies constitute a policy portfolio. Nash equilibrium refers to a combination of such a strategy which is a combination of all participants' optimal strategy components. Given that in the case of some strategy, no one is willing to take the lead to break this balance.

(2) Nash equilibrium is a collective irrationality. When Nash equilibrium is reached, it does not mean that the game does not move the two sides in a state game in order to reach this equilibrium which is continuous in the players' actions and reactions. Nash equilibrium does not mean that the two sides reached in a whole game of optimal state, such as the famous "prisoner's dilemma" game though cooperate with each other, in which the two insisted not to tell the truth to bring in the best interests for all (acquitted). But under unknown circumstances, betray his associates may bring their own interests (shorter term) and associates can move out of his own for his benefit, therefore in violation of betraying each other, their best interests weigh more than their common interests. If Nash equilibrium is be reached, both participants are going to betray each other.

(3) Nash game is an asymmetric information game. In a single game, the information is unknown, without prior exchange of information and consensus. For their own best interests, ultimately both parties choose another report. If you choose to be silent, you will run the risk of being betrayed by his associates. in order to avoid making benefit to others and let their impaired behavior (essentially spotted with each other compared to other acts on their advantage), ultimately both choose the non-prisoner rational confess. In several games, the game is repeatedly carried out. Each participant has the opportunity to "punish" uncooperative behavior of another participant in the previous round. In this case, cooperation may occur as a result of equilibrium. At this time the motive of deception could overcome threatened punishment, possibly lead to a better result if cooperating. As repeated nearly that infinite number of Nash equilibrium tends to be Pareto optimum.

2.2. Theory of Food Safety Supervision Game

Food safety regulators as part of the implementation of public administration in particular, there are essentially common public policy. In essence the study of public policy, the behaviorist political scientist David Easton that "public policy is made on the value of the whole society authoritative allocation"(Feng Jing; Yang Zhiyun, 2009). In other words, the essence of a policy is that it deprives some people occupy them while allow other people to enjoy something. Here's the "value" mainly refers to "interest." There is an implicit logic: the object of public policy both beneficiaries have non-beneficiaries. This is just the most common pattern of distribution of benefits, namely a negative-sum game with a zero-sum game. Obviously, both beneficiaries of food safety regulation, there are also non-beneficiaries.

In theoretical and value level, in the food security market governments、 businesses and consumers ought to belong cooperation, and economic interests of business expansion supremacy of human nature and government of their own interests, so that cooperation mutates into a game. Due to the demands of different interests of various stakeholders in the policy-making process, they expand the game in policy formulation and implementation process.

Government-makers are responsible to the main and safety regulatory policies, the interests of the authority of the allocation and regulators. On one hand, as a representative of the interests of the citizens, they maintain and strengthen the

government's authority and they are the guardian of citizens food safety. The government needs the "small government and big society" shift in the situation, through the system and law enforcement to protect the interests of consumers. On the other hand, to obtain greater benefits, and their own self-interest for local, often breed abuse of power behavior. It is worth noting that, in the interests of the game process, the enterprise is to obtain greater profits and increase the ability to influence policy, willing to take risks in crime against the wind, while also taking the interests of conspiracy, through legitimate and non-legitimate means to seek and expand interest and government overlapping area, thus influencing policy. More cases of collusion with the government will choose to take rent-seeking, capture-governmental organizations or officials, so that the policy direction towards their favor. In the interests of consumers in order to win the game, you will need to be integrated different interests. From the microscopic point of view, during the execution of public policy, the various interest groups will put their own interests demand input policy-making system. However, the policy object in the expression of interest, due to the unique personal gain is difficult to influence policy processes and results, so individual interests must rise to group interests, class interests can become a content policy. In this process of rising, there must be a comprehensive benefits seek common ground, remove the specific interests of the contents of the individual. (Li Zhangjian; Zhang Feng, 2007). Therefore, consumer associations and other relevant social organizations becoming spokesmen for the interests of consumers.

In the current global situation, Chen Qingyun single contrary to the interests of the central tendency of gradual pattern of interests and diverse reality. Western scholars in the pattern of interests when dealing with globalization, tend to use the policy network analysis paradigm that emphasizes the government as the main core and includes other policy interests of the game, including a diverse and complex model to explain the process and substance of public policy: the government as the core the policy group based target specific period, through a variety of conflicts of interest to the community in diverse stakeholders to coordinate the interests of the selection and integration aspirations, in the pursuit of effective promotion and equitable distribution of social benefits and realize the interests of balance and harmony in the process conduct specified.

3. Game Model Build Interest

3.1. Interests Game Relational Model

Food safety supervision after another falls, more importantly, because the root causes of food safety related to local government, business and enterprise as well as the various departments, the interests of consumers. Intricate relationship between them, between the interests of intricate, therefore, need to discuss a comprehensive analysis rather than unilaterally to discern the underlying causes of food safety regulatory failure. According to the analysis and deduction interests of the game theory, various stakeholders are present game.


Figure 1. Relations interests of the game diversified portfolio

In this figure 1 means the game between central government and local governments game, II means the local governments game, III represent different industries and enterprises in the game, IV means the game between the same industries and enterprises, V means the game between the government and enterprises, VI represents businesses and Game between consumers, VII means the game between the government and consumers, VIII means the government and corporate collusion with the consumer after the game, IX means the Government in collaboration with businesses and consumers Game. Game between government and enterprises, enterprises and consumers, governments and consumers are to form a food safety regulatory cycle game chain. And there are internal nodes of the game in the every chain of the game, such as local government and the central government, as different enterprises in the same industry. For the game the central government and local governments, businesses and consumers, academics from different angles depth study, this paper focuses on the struggle between the government and enterprises, to explore the role played by consumers in food safety supervision.

3.2. Interests Game Model

Through the food safety regulatory interest in the comb, we need to clarify the relationship between game and game combination between the parties, to provide the basic framework to construct the model. In summary, scholars established the cost model between government and enterprises, enterprises and consumers' benefit. Only the cost of government checks, benefits, the costs、penalties and income of enterprise, consumer utility variables to be considered as a game. The government's reputation as a priority that the Government's efforts to improve often is overlooked in the game, the credibility of corporate interests as an important part of it has not been considered. Meanwhile, in food safety game, academic focus only costs between businesses and consumers - the utility of income gains and losses, while ignoring the role of consumers in the active supervision of food safety supervision. In this paper, since there is the credibility of the government and the business model in the game, the game will be important to weigh the parameters with a new inter-governmental and business interests of competition. In addition, in the case of food insecurity, through the establishment of consumer and business reporting, not reporting the cost - benefit model to explore the role of consumer behavior in the food safety supervision.

3.2.1. Game Model Assumptions

The government and enterprises, enterprises and consumers take part in the game. Considered the assumption that governments, businesses and consumers are rational, so the government is pursuing utility maximization, businesses and consumers is seeking to maximize the benefits. There is information asymmetry between the three, the government has allocated interest policy advantages, companies have all the information on food, and consumers have only the part of the information. There are two options on government regulation of food safety: check, do not check; corporate food production. There are two options: the production of quality and safety of food and unsafe food; unsafe food consumers have two choices: to report and not to report it. Enterprise is the production quality and safety of products and the government decided to check, without checking the acts are carried out simultaneously, they had no idea that their actions are static Nash game; while enterprise makes the decisions whether make the safe production or unsafe products isn't at the same time with consumers and consumers decide to report, not reported behavior is the order only after the production quality of unsafe products, consumers will consider the report, do not report, so they are sequential game.

First, set cost-benefit code between the game of the government and enterprises.

(1) the cost of government regulation of enterprises is C, the production quality of the product cost of security for the $C1$, the production cost of the product unsafe for $C2$ ($C1 > C2$), the cost of consumer complaints for $C_{Consumer}$ (including time spent, effort and equivalent to the cost of collecting evidence, proof, etc.);

(2) the production of security products revenue for $P1$, produce unsafe products revenue for $P2$; detect security problems if the government enterprise, the grant recovery, consolidation or even stop other penalties equivalent to the amount of H, and give companies a fine compensation $rP2$ ($r > 1$); unsafe for the production of quality products, consumer complaints, if successful, to receive compensation for the $P3$ ($rP2 > P3 > C_{Consumer}$), if the complaint, the consumer utility loss for U canceled. Assume that the probability of success of consumer complaints is P, not the probability of success for $1-P$ [Note: If the consumer complaint is successful, all cite a complaint, the burden of proof borne by the enterprise, if fails, then all the costs borne by individual consumers]

(3) If the enterprise security problems have been exposed, damaged the credibility of the government for the $V1$ governance, corporate reputation damage to $V1_{governance}$; safety issues if the company does not exist, then the government's reputation gains for $V2_{governance}$, corporate reputation gains for $V2$ ($V1 > V2$).

Secondly, the calculation of the cost of the game between the two sides - earnings.

Table 1. Utility Matrix

|	Security Products	Unsafe products
Examine	$V2_{governance}-C$, $V2+P1-C1$	$H+rP2-V1_{governance} -C$, $P2-C2-H-rP2-V1$
Not Examine	$V2_{governance}$, $V2+P1-C1$	$-V1_{governance}$, $P2-C2$

Figure 2. Unsafe consumer products companies produce quality games cost - benefit analysis

Table 1 game between the government and enterprises based on the assumption determined:

(1) When the production of security products and government checks, corporate profits obtained for $V2 + P1-C1$, government revenue for $V2_{governance} -C$;

(2) When an enterprise of production quality security products and government checks, utility companies get for $P2-C2-H-rP2-V1$, government effectiveness for $H + rP2-V1_{governance}-C$;

(3) When companies produce safe products while the government does not check, corporate profits for $V2 + P1-C1$, the government utility to obtain $V2_{governance}$;

(4) When the production quality of their food insecurity and the government did not check, corporate profits for the $P2-C2$, government effectiveness for $-V1_{governance}$.

As can be seen from the above Table 1 game matrix, for enterprises, if make unsafe products, there is the risk of being severely punished or even the government closed, so from their own interests, the interests of the enterprise rather give up the choice of $P2-C2$ production quality and safety of products, and earn $V2 + P1-C1$ profits. While taking into severely punished account due to making unsafe products, enterprises as rational economic man are unwilling to take such a big risk against the wind, will choose to produce safe products; On the other hand, for their own trade-offs, corporates are more likely to choose producing safe products. In this case if government chooses not to check, erterprises do not need to pay the cost when can obtain $V2_{governance}$, so the government will not check to make choices. So in this game, the government and enterprises Nash equilibrium is (not checked, the production of security products).

By Figure 2, we can see that, for unsafe products, if consumers choose not to complain which will result in the loss of utility $U_{consumer}$. If you choose to complaints and successfully, you can get $P3- U_{consumer}$; And if the complaint is unsuccessful, the consumer should bear the loss of $C_{consumer}$

$+ U_{consumer}$ of extinction. Based on the above, consideration of the success rate of the complaints, the selected consumer complaints total utility is obtained: $U = P (P3- U_{consumer}) + (1-P) (-U_{consumer} - C_{consumer}) = P (P3- C_{consumer}) - C_{consumer} - U_{consumer}$. In China, the enterprise has an absolute advantage due to food information, and poor information openness and authenticity, to collect evidence of poor channels, so $P\sim 0$, so $U= P (P3- C_{consumer}) - C_{consumer} - U_{consumer} <- U_{consumer}$. Since $U<- U_{consumer}$ complaints that the utility is not less than the utility of not complaints, consumers will ultimately make the choice of behavior is not a complaint.

Finally, the government, businesses and consumers will ultimately choose the strategy and the reasons for analysis. Game matrix in government and business both chose the Nash equilibrium strategy: Do not check, but produce security products. This policy for the government and consumers should be optimized, ideal choice, but in real life, but why frequent adverse selection? In recent years, social major food safety incidents repeated, several companies choose to produce the quality of unsafe products, safety of life and property caused by severe involvement of consumers. Theory and reality shows whether the failure theory contrary to logical deduction? The reason was the result of adverse selection theory of reality and contrary to, the following aspects should be considered: ① the firm is rational an economic man, and making profit is its ultimate goal, and therefore the risk and lack of career preferences morality of companies have chosen production of unsafe food; Game ② above conclusion is a single of the interests of the game, because the information on both sides do not mutualunderstand, for rational consideration of their insurance benefits and the choice of the optimal strategy. The reality of life is repeated competition, game information and changes in the formation of the power to select different strategies; ③ because of without huge human, material and financial resources, government can't the businesses one by one. In addition, government is captived so that enterprises can learn more about the informations of government action

dynamic, and therefore occupy the information advantage.

Barzel thinks property assets are unlikely to be fully defined. Many people will choose Properties sort of interest in the properties, and then follow the order to understand, until it reaches the boundary point defined property rights, such as over the border continue to define, asset owners will suffer. Definition of property rights is always relative rather than absolute definition of property rights has led to the relativity of rights will always be part of the assets have not been defined, property rights are not defined in this part will enter Barzel called "public sphere" among (Barzel, 2006). According to the "public sphere" Barzel property rights theory, as the government repeatedly game in-depth understanding of the enterprise, the Government will give it the optimal choice (do not check) and the choice of checking policy. Many enterprises, the government can only take a sample survey, the government interest and the right to produce significant business risks for inspection until the inspection to the food regulatory boundary points. At this border point, the effectiveness of government regulation brought to zero, if it exceeds this boundary point will bring huge losses to the government, and government-led government's regulatory approach so elusive ability. Well, the government did not check to corporate and regulatory security risks existing cannot be eliminated. Meanwhile, according to the behavior of consumers to take no complaints of unsafe products on the trade-offs, it is narrowing the scope of food regulation; expand the government and regulation of the consumer space. Leaving loopholes for companies, fueling companies have chances of immoral choices, eventually leading to irrational Prisoner's Dilemma. Therefore, the study of the nature of its social reality of food safety supervision adverse selection shall be vested in the root zone in the middle of government regulation and social forces at the border point of food safety supervision existing among the outside, that "supervision of the public domain" (Zhang Jun Hao, 2014) Government and consumers as the two main forces of food safety regulation, among them the existence nobody cares "middle ground", resulting in China's food safety supervision "manage well, uncontrollable, but cannot supervise the security."

4. Thoughts on Food Safety Supervision

Food safety related to social stability and healthy development of the people's life and health and the economy, is not allowed due to the occasional oversight people's lives and property caused by the enormous losses. Therefore, the elimination of food safety regulation in the "public sphere" is to achieve full coverage of food safety regulation is a shared responsibility and obligation of government and society. By food safety supervision, we can ensure our own security.

1. Use the idea of strengthening cooperation in diverse social governance body made clear the main roles and functions of the position of food safety regulation. The third plenary session of the communist party of China (18) proposed to build an innovative social governance system,

"social governance" concept has become the ruling government service concept. In the economic transition, social transformation process, due to the relationship between government, market and society did not completely clarify the government offside, and not in place resulting in the absence of food safety regulatory system is difficult to achieve its vision. (Qin Li; Wang Qingsong, 2009). On the one hand, in the food safety regulatory process, the government must clarify responsibilities, rules, and create a fair, orderly and competitive environment; on the other hand, to achieve food security, we must break the monopoly of government regulation, and actively introduce other subjects participate. Make up the government's shortcomings, the government "can not provide, resolve bad" and "regulation in the public domain" to the community to do it. Specific actors NGO is both social and public services, but also a collaborator government services community.

In short, the government should rely on the community, to cultivate and develop social organizations together to form a food safety regulation. Governments, individuals, community organizations tripartite cooperation is mutually beneficial relationship; you can achieve the maximum benefit of food safety, bringing multi-Founder and Game.

2. Build civil society and foster the third sector. Civil society is pluralism, openness, legislative, which constitutes the fertile soil of the third sector growth and development. Individual consumers are too scattered weak, rising only to the interests of individual groups, class interests, in order to create a strong regulatory power. This paper argues that the game is only enhanced consumer power, improve the status of the game, and enhance regulatory capacity in order to achieve full coverage of the regulation. Thus, on the one hand, civil society is accompanied by the gradual development of market economy began to develop, the government should continue efforts to promote the establishment and improvement of the market economy, the role of civil society to play a market economy endogenous dominant force as, foster food security report awareness, equality and mutual benefit of the contractual relationship, to promote the rational and efficient flow of social resources, the status of citizens in a fair game in the public interest. On the other hand, the traditional social contract theory to build "political state - civil society" two yuan architecture to a "market failure" and "government failure", "dynamic contract theory" proposed that people will cede power to the government should also be transfer to community organizations, building from the government, individuals two yuan society to government, social organizations, individuals ternary structure of society (Ding Yuan Zhu, 2013). That is according to the social status of different identities, play a different role, to keep people in the transaction process, "correction fair." However, our country's third sector is still very young, organizational development capability is not strong, the government itself and its behavior constitutes a development of the third sector in the basic environment, which requires the government to maintain a certain independence of the third sector and

independent under the condition, its proper foster and nurture, such as food and nutrition associations, consumer associations. Involvement of the third sector to stimulate the enthusiasm of food safety regulation, give full play to their expertise and unique advantages, to achieve the required learning general secretary "Food safety is the tube out."

3. Establish an information-sharing platform. Imperfect information and incomplete market issues in food safety regulation is widespread. Regulators in order to achieve regulatory purposes, must take advantage of the regulated business information. Learn the basics of food, help the community to discover the problem foods. In today's era of big data, information overload and false information filled in life, do not help us to identify "good food" and "the problem of food." Led by the government, the establishment of information sharing platform, enterprises will be mandatory for food products Basic information released to the community through the platform. At the same time, stakeholders can exchange information through the platform the same kind of quality of food or similar form Forced mechanism, increasing the cost of crimes, forcing enterprises to improve product quality, but also can be the platform to report on the issue of food. The food information disclosure sunlight, reduce the social costs of food safety regulation to help stimulate community on food safety concern and attention. Through the information platform, problems in food can be captured and identified in time, thereby reducing the problem of food hazards to the community. Litigation related businesses through the platform, reduce litigation costs, streamline proceedings, litigation and improve processing efficiency.

REFERENCES

[1] Rolf, M.2007. Comparison of Scenarios Futures of European Food Ehain, in Trends in Food Science & Technology, Vol 18,No.540—545.

[2] Aruoma,O.2006.The Impact of Food Regulationon the Food Supply Chain, Toxicology, Vol 11, No.119—127.

[3] Lin Mingang; Xu Jinliang.2008.China's food safety problems in transition, Chinese administration, Vol 10.

[4] Li Jing. 2011. analyze the effectiveness of China's food safety regulatory system - based on Chinese dairy regulatory investigation, Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol 2.

[5] Hanzhong Wei; Liu Yuji.2010.from staging an equitable regulatory supervision of administrative power steering - Construction of China's food safety regulatory model, The question, June.

[6] Ding Huang; Sun wen.2014.from administrative supervision to social co-governance: food safety regulatory system breakthrough - Based on the Network Analysis, in Jiangsu Administration Institute, Vol 1, No.109-115.

[7] Yan Haina; Nieyong Hao.2009.system selection logic - the evolution of China's food safety regulatory system, in Journal of Public Management, Vol 3.

[8] Liu Peng.2010.China's food safety regulators - Empirical Study Based on institutional change and performance evaluation, in Journal of Public Management, Vol 2.

[9] Feng Jing; Yang Zhiyun.2009.Under the perspective of the interests of the public policy process analysis, Chinese administration, Vol 1,No.26-30.

[10] Lizhang Jian; Zhang Feng.2007.build food safety supervision of a third force [J] Productivity Research, Vol 15, No.77-79.

[11] Barzel.2006. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights", Shanghai Joint Publishing Company (The Book).

[12] Zhang Jun Hao.2014. China's food safety supervision and mode changes: an analytical framework of property theory, macro-quality research, March, Vol 1,No.70-75.

[13] Qin Li; Wang Qingsong.2009.light Tong Ji, multi-center-based food safety issues cooperative governance research, Agricultural Mechanization Research, Vol 3.

[14] Ding Yuan Zhu.2013.stimulate innovation and social governance and social development activity, The front, Vol 12, No.42-45.